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Abstract 
 
The paper sets up a two-country asymmetric trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms, 
search frictions and endogenous labor market institutions. Countries are linked by trade 
in goods and non-cooperatively set unemployment beneﬁts to maximize national welfare. 
We show that more open and smaller economies have more generous unemployment 
beneﬁt replacement rates as a larger fraction of the costs is borne by foreign trading 
partners. These results are in line with empirical stylized facts. Additionally, we ﬁnd 
that the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts is independent from the level of unem-
ployment  beneﬁts  abroad  and  that  non-cooperatively  set  unemployment  rates  are 
ineﬃciently high. 
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Countries diﬀer dramatically with respect to the generosity of their labor market institutions.
For instance, OECD data show that the average net unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate
varies between about 82% in Denmark to 8% in Italy.1 What are the determinants of these
diﬀerences? Using data for OECD countries from 1961-2007, we present two stylized facts: the
generosity of unemployment beneﬁts is larger in more open economies and smaller in larger
countries. This correlation holds unconditionally, but also survives conditioning on country
eﬀects or GDP per capita. It is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. So far, the
literature has documented similar patterns for very general measures of government size (Rodrik,
1998) but not for the speciﬁc case of labor market institions. In this paper, we show that a
plain vanilla combination of a workhorse trade model (Melitz, 2003) and the leading search-
matching labor market paradigm (Pissarides and Pissarides, 1994), with governments choosing
unemployment beneﬁts non-cooperatively, yields implications that are consistent with these
stylized facts.
Our model deviates from the standard search model by allowing ﬁrms to operate on declining
marginal revenues schedules due to monopolistic competition. With individual intra-ﬁrm wage
bargaining, this gives rise to an over-hiring externality. Firms hire workers beyond the point
where employment costs equal marginal product. This reduces the threat point of the marginal
worker whose contribution to the total value of the ﬁrm is depressed by expanding the work
force. However, this strategic incentive is socially harmful as it increases the tightness of the
labor market beyond the constrained Pareto eﬃcient level. This implies that, in the context
of monopoly power on the product markets and individual bargaining, the well-known Hosios
condition, that guarantees eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium in the standard search
model, is no longer suﬃcient. So, our model generates a welfare rationale for the existing of
unemployment beneﬁts while the standard model would not, in particular if the Hosios condition
is fulﬁlled.
We use this framework to study trade between two asymmetric countries. Since our stylized
1Averaged over four family situations and over 60 months of unemployment.
1facts hinge on data from OECD countries, where trade is mostly of the intra-industry type, we
work with a one-sector model of trade in diﬀerentiated goods. However, we allow for an endoge-
nous non-traded sector, since ﬁrms with low levels of labor productivity will sell only to domestic
consumers, foreign markets being too costly to enter. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
governments set unemployment beneﬁts to maximize the representative agent’s welfare and that
beneﬁts are ﬁnanced in a non-distortive fashion.2 In a closed economy, governments would fully
internalize the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the size of demand for their ﬁrms. In a model
with monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm-level, market size is a
key variable as it determines the number of varieties available to consumers. With international
trade, domestic consumers purchase varieties from foreign ﬁrms and domestic ﬁrms sell to for-
eign consumers. Taking the foreign market size as given, the government does not internalize
the eﬀect of its policies for foreign ﬁrms nor does it internalize their eﬀect on foreign demand
for domestic varieties. Since that externality is negative, it follows that, in a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium, governments set unemployment beneﬁts too generously than if they would set
them cooperatively. It also follows that the extent to which countries depend on foreign markets
matters. Countries that are more open or that are smaller rely to a larger extent on foreign
demand for their exports and on foreign production for their imports. In those countries, the
externality is larger and hence beneﬁts are provided more generously.
In this paper, we show that the intuition sketched above holds in an asymmetric two-country
version of the model by Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), who have introduced labor
market search frictions into the perfectly symmetric Melitz (2003) trade model. That symmetric
model is fully understood analytically. It is well known, that asymmetric models of that kind
cannot be solved analytically so that we resort to a calibration-cum-simulation approach. This
has tradition in the macro labor literature, but also in the trade literature; see Bernard, Redding
and Schott (2007). In a fully standard calibration of the model satisfying the parametrical
restriction implied by the Hosios condition (in absence of monopoly power), we show that the
over-hiring externality implies an optimal gross unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate of about
12%. Violating the Hosios condition, we calibrate the elasticity of the matching function, for
2The most interesting alternative assumption would probably be to study lobbying for or against generous
beneﬁt systems by trade unions and ﬁrms.
2which empirical estimates are fairly uncertain in order to replicate the 40% gross replacement
rate in the data. For given bargaining power of workers, this implies a stronger monopsony
position of ﬁrms, but the required violation of the Hosios condition remains minor. We show
that welfare maximizing unemployment beneﬁts are decreasing in variable trade costs so that
more open economies opt for more generous beneﬁts. We also show that domestic market size
is negatively correlated with generosity of unemployment beneﬁts.
While other papers highlight the role of uncertainty for the correlation between openness
and government size (Rodrik, 1998) or terms-of-trade eﬀects (Epifani and Gancia, 2009), we
illustrate a new mechanism that relates to the role of market size. Moreover, we focus on a very
speciﬁc feature of the welfare state: unemployment beneﬁts.
Related literature. Our paper is related to at least three strands of literature. First, the
literature provides essentially three eﬃciency reasons why non-zero unemployment beneﬁts are
optimal. In the context of the standard (linear utility) Pissarides (2000) search-and-matching
framework, a violation of the Hosios condition (workers’ bargaining power smaller than elastic-
ity of the matching function with respect to vacancies relative to searching workers) gives ﬁrms
too much local monopsony power while workers have too little relative bargaining power; this
can be remedied by unemployment beneﬁts. When wages are not bargained between workers
and employers but posted as take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by employers, then monopsony power of
ﬁrms again warrants policy intervention. Burdett-Mortensen (1998) show that in this context
unemployment beneﬁts are eﬃciency enhancing.3 A second line of thinking views beneﬁts as
search subsidies that can enhance eﬃciency when the composition of jobs matters. Acemoglu
(2001) changes the standard Pissarides (2000) model in that he allows vacancy creation costs
to diﬀer across sectors. Those costs have to be sunk before wages are bargained and are ir-
reversible. In this situation, workers can extract higher wages in the high-cost sector where
the hold-up problem is larger. Firms create too little high-cost jobs, and job composition is
ineﬃcient. Unemployment beneﬁts can remedy this in that they make low-cost jobs particularly
more expensive. Other papers, such as Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) make similar arguments
3Manning (2006) shows that, when unemployment beneﬁts are conditioned on search activities (i.e. not granted
if agents exit from the labor market altogether), they can restore the ﬁrst-best allocation.
3but work with a model that features two-sided heterogeneity. A last welfare argument relies
on insurance. When ﬁnancial markets are incomplete and workers are risk averse, there is
an eﬃciency rationale for unemployment insurance. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) develop a
search-and-matching model for risk-averse workers which deviates signiﬁcantly from the stan-
dard Pissarides or Burdett-Mortensen models. Workers queue for jobs, and workers post wages.
In that setup, they show how unemployment beneﬁts work as insurance. In our paper we follow
the monopsony tradition because this is most straight-forwardly implemented in a canonical
search model with international trade.
Our paper is also related to a large and growing literature on the interaction between interna-
tional trade and labor market outcomes under search frictions or other non-Walrasian features.
Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1988, 1999) and Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (2009) have imple-
mented search frictions into a Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. More recently,
research has turned towards trade models featuring monopolistic competition as in Krugman
(1980) and ﬁrm-level heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003). While Egger and Kreickemeier (2009)
draw on the fair wage approach, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Felbermayr, Prat, and
Schmerer (2011) use the search and matching approach. It is well known that models featuring
monopolistic competition and country asymmetries, while realistic, do no allow analytical results.
There are suggestions to overcome this problem.4 However, all these strategies have shortcom-
ings. For example, the symmetry assumption does not allow to study endogenous labor market
institutions, as in order to do so, countries have to be allowed to be potentially asymmetric.
And ruling out income eﬀects via an outside good shuts down an important transmission chan-
nel between trading countries. Therefore, the present paper adopts a calibration-cum-simulation
approach as is customary in the macro labor literature. Also note that our work is related to a
literature that views labor market institutions as sources for comparative advantage; see Cunat
and Melitz (2010) for an example and further references.
Finally, our work relates to research on the role of openness and market extension for the
4For example, concentrate on symmetric countries, ﬁx expected wages in a num´ eraire sector that remains
unaﬀected by monopoly power and trade costs, or ﬁx the number of potential entrants. See Egger, Egger, and
Markusen (2010), Egger and Kreickemeier (2008, 2009), Eckel and Egger (2009), Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer
(2011a).
4share of public spending in GDP. While we focus on a speciﬁc feature of the welfare state,
unemployment beneﬁts, Rodrik (1998) has more generally asked “Why do more open economies
have bigger governments?”. His response relies on the presumption that public spending provides
insurance against the risks of international markets. Since smaller economies tend to be more
open, country size is negatively related to public insurance; see also Alesina and Wacziarg (1998).
More closely related to our work, Epifani and Gancia (2009) study the role of international spill-
overs and ﬁnd empirical evidence for their terms-of-trade channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts.
Section 3 outlines the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the model calibration. Section
5 discusses the question whether there is a case for labor market institutions in the proposed
framework. Section 6 investigates the relationship between optimal unemployment beneﬁts and
openness, whereas Section 7 discusses the relationship between optimal unemployment bene-
ﬁts and country size. Section 8 deals with the case where both countries set their optimal
unemployment beneﬁts simultaneously, whereas in Section 9 we investigate the outcome under
cooperation. The last section concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
We motivate our analysis by two simple stylized facts: in the cross-section, openness to interna-
tional trade and gross unemployment beneﬁt replacement rates are positively correlated while
market size is negatively correlated to the generosity of beneﬁts. To illustrate these facts, we
use data provided by the OECD on gross unemployment replacement rates for every second
year from 1961 to 2007.5 The data covers 29 OECD member states. In 2005, in our sample,
the average gross replacement rate was about 24.9 with a standard deviation of 13.2. That
measure does not include social assistance payments. The OECD also provides information on
net replacement rates that do include social assistance payments.6 The sample average for 2005
5The OECD summary measure is deﬁned as the average of the gross unemployment beneﬁt replacement rates
for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment. Data is freely available at
the site www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives.
6The measure is calculated as the average over four family situations (single, married, with and without
children) and over 60 months of unemployment.
5is 55.8 with a standard deviation of 19.9. The correlation between the net and the gross measure
is 0.47 (statistically signiﬁcant at the 2% level).
Figure 1 provides scatter plots of openness or log population against the gross or net re-
placement rate for data from the year of 2005. Openness is measured based on the usual (im-
ports+exports)/GDP measure, but using the correction proposed by Alcala and Ciccone (2004).
The correlation in all diagrams is quite striking: more open economies have both higher gross
and net replacement rates; larger economies (as measured by the log of population) have lower
replacement rates, both gross and net. The partial correlations are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level and economically quite substantial. An increase in the openness index by one standard
deviation (42.33) is associated with a 7.20 percentage points increase in the net replacement
rate and a 9.74 percentage points increase in the gross rate. A doubling of size lowers the gross
rate by 4.43 percentage points and the net rate by 7.09 points. We do not want to argue for a
causal relationship; the degree of openness as measured in the data and the replacement rate
being both endogenous in our model. However, repeating the exercise illustrated in Figure 1
with initial openness (as of 1971) yields a very similar picture.
Table 2 provides more rigorous empirical evidence about the conditional eﬀects of openness
and size on the generosity of unemployment insurance, controlling also for GDP per capita.
Rather than using the cross-section, it exploits the panel dimension of the OECD data. The
ﬁrst seven columns use the log of the gross replacement rate as the dependent variable; the last
2 columns use the log of the net replacement rate. Columns (1) to (6) draw on odd years from
1961-2007, while the net rates are available only from 2001 onwards until 2007. The sample of
net rates is therefore considerably smaller. We use a log-log speciﬁcation, so that all coeﬃcients
are interpreted as elasticities. Using a model in levels yields similar results, but the RMSE and
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8Column (1) presents the results of a pooled regression with year dummies. Size and GDP
per capita do not turn out statistically signiﬁcant, but openness does. A one percent increase
in openness increases the generosity of net beneﬁts by about 0.6 percent. Adding country ﬁxed
eﬀects (along with the year dummies) to account for constant country characteristics that may
correlate with the replacement rate and openness, the estimated elasticity of openness remains
close to the one found in speciﬁcation (2). Adding size (column (3)) or GDP per capita (column
(4)) carves out a fairly robust pattern that was already visible in the scatter plots: openness
increases the generosity of beneﬁts and size decreases it. Controlling for GDP per capita does not
undo this. Actually, it allows more precise estimation of the openness elasticity. The elasticity
of openness (0.52) is about a quarter as big as the elasticity of size (2.4).
Regression (5) to (7) are robustness checks to (4). Column (5) uses a random eﬀects spec-
iﬁcation instead of the ﬁxed eﬀects model. While signs do not change, only the signiﬁcance of
openness remains. However, the Hausman test strongly indicates that the ﬁxed eﬀects approach
is to be preferred. Column (6) uses a linear, a quadratic and a cubic time trend instead of year
dummies. This choice does reduce the elasticity of openness to 0.27, but statistical signiﬁcance
is restored. The other elasticities remain fairly similar to those in column (4). Finally, we use
the short panel (for which net beneﬁts are available) in column (7). Again, openness turns out
to increase generosity while size reduces it.
Regressions (8) to (9) turn to the net replacement rate as the dependent variable. The results
conﬁrm those for gross rates. It does not matter at all how exactly we control for time trends
(using dummies as in column (8) or using parametric time trends (as in (9)). Summarizing, our
empirical results suggest that more open economies have more generous unemployment beneﬁts,
both gross and net. And larger countries have less generous ones. These ﬁndings are in line with
those presented by Rodrik (1998), Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) or Epifani and Gancia (2009)
who study more comprehensive measures of public spending and government size.
3 Model Setup
As we allow countries to endogenously choose the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts, we need
a model that allows for asymmetries between countries. We model the labor market following
9the search and matching approach. In that setup, unemployment is a function of observable de-
terminants, such as unemployment beneﬁts, so that endogenizing the labor market institutions
is straightforward. Other ways of modeling labor markets, such as fairness concerns, are less
suitable when allowing for an endogenous choice by countries. Finally, we use the extension to
heterogeneous ﬁrms of the Krugman (1980) model by Melitz (2003). That generalization pro-
vides additional channels through which labor market institutions in one country aﬀect outcomes
in its trading partners, which are well in line with recent empirical ﬁndings on ﬁrm selection.7
Moreover, it comes at little additional modeling cost, since the asymmetric Krugman (1980)
model does not allow closed form analytical solutions, neither. Our model description follows
closely Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011a) with the extension to allow for two potentially
asymmetric countries and endogenous labor market institutions.
3.1 Demand for Intermediate Inputs
Our world consists of two potentially asymmetric countries, labeled home H and foreign F,
respectively. The countries have work forces denoted by LH and LF, respectively. Labor is the
only original factor of production. In each country, ﬁrms produce a ﬁnal output good Y under
perfect competition. The single, ﬁnal output good can be consumed or used as an input in the
production process. That good is assembled from a continuum of intermediate inputs, indexed
by ω, and supplied by domestic and foreign ﬁrms who operate under conditions of monopolistic
competition. Denoting the quantity of such an input as q(ω), the aggregate production function
in country i = {H,F} is
Yi =
{










where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The set of available
intermediate inputs in country i, Ωi, has measure ¯ Mi. Premultiplying by ( ¯ Mi)− 1
 shuts down
the usual love for variety channel so that the number of available varieties is irrelevant for total
output for symmetric countries.
7See Bernard and Jensen (2004) and references therein.
10Similar to Melitz (2003), intermediate input ﬁrms are uniquely described by diﬀerent produc-
tivity levels φ and place of origin, so that we can use φ to index intermediate input producers.
Input producers at home face per-period ﬁxed costs on the domestic and foreign market, fHH
and fHF respectively. Serving some market j by a ﬁrm located in i entails iceberg trade costs

























where Pi is the aggregate price index and p[ω] is the price of variety ω. We choose the price
index of the home country as the num´ eraire, i.e., PH = 1. Proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms allocate sales
across markets such that marginal revenues are equalized. This implies pij[φ] = τijpii[φ] for all
markets j on which a ﬁrm φ based in country i is active. Operating revenues of ﬁrms based in
country i from sales to market j are therefore equal to Rij[φ] = pij[φ]qij[φ]/τij. Total revenue
















where Iij[φ] is an indicator function that takes value one if a ﬁrm in country i with productivity
φ is active on market j and zero otherwise.
3.2 The Labor Market
Firms operate with linear production functions qij[φ] = φLij[φ], where Lij[φ] is the level of
employment at ﬁrm φ in country i used for the production of goods destined for country j. Our
model is in discrete time and all payments are made at the end of each period. At the end of
each period, ﬁrms and workers are hit by two diﬀerent types of shocks: With probability χ a
job is destroyed due to a match-speciﬁc shock and with probability δ ﬁrms are forced to leave
the market. Assuming independence of these shocks, the actual rate of job destruction is given
by η = δ + χ − δχ.
The ﬂow cost of posting a single vacancy is c, measured in units of the ﬁnal good. We
11denote by mi[θi] = ¯ m(θi)
−α the share of posted vacancies v ﬁlled each period, where θi is the
vacancy-unemployment ratio in country i and ¯ m measures the eﬃciency of the labor market in
country i, while α is the elasticity of the matching function. The rate at which unemployed
workers ﬁnd employment is θimi [θi].
Each period, an intermediate input producer φ in country i decides (i) about the optimal
number of vacancies to post, vi [φ], anticipating the bargained wage, and (ii) how to allocate
total production over the domestic and the foreign markets.
The value of an intermediate input producer is given by:





Ri[φ] − wi [φ]Li[φ] − Pivi [φ]c − Pi
∑
j∈{H,F}





i [φ] = (1 − χ)Li [φ] + mi[θi]vi [φ],
where r denotes the interest rate, wi [φ] is the wage rate, J′
i [φ] is the value of an intermediate
input producer next period, and L′
i [φ] is ﬁrm φ′s total employment next period. The constraint
is the law of motion of employment at the ﬁrm level. Using the ﬁrst order conditions for
vacancy posting and labor units and employing the steady-state condition, we can determine
the pricing behavior of the ﬁrm. The important conclusions are that a ﬁrm equalizes marginal
revenues across markets and that the optimal pricing behavior is the same for ﬁrms with diﬀerent
productivities (see for more details Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer, 2011a).8
Concerning the wage-setting process we follow Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer (2008) and
assume that wages are bargained before production takes place and that every worker is treated
as the marginal worker.9 Market power of ﬁrms on product market and individual bargaining
imply an over-hiring externality: ﬁrms wish to hire more workers than socially optimal because
this depresses the contribution of the marginal worker to the value of the ﬁrm, thereby reducing
her bargaining power. However, this strategic behavior increases labor market tightness beyond
8We choose to work work with discrete time as we ultimately aim to calibrate the model. The continuous
time model can be thought of as the limit of the discrete time model where ∆t ! dt; model predictions are not
aﬀected by this. However, note that the job ﬁll and the job ﬁnd rates (¯ m(i)
  and ¯ m(i)
1 , respectively) are
Poisson rates in the continuous time version (with support over R
+. They are probabilities in the discrete time
framework with support in [0;1]. To meet this restriction, ¯ m must be small enough.
9The axiomatic foundation of this approach is laid out in Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
12the Pareto constrained eﬃcient level and congests the labor market so that ﬁrms pay higher
search costs. The total surplus from a successful match is split between the employee and the
intermediate input producer. The worker’s surplus is equal to the diﬀerence between the value
of being employed at ﬁrm φ, i.e., Ei [φ] = (wi [φ] + (1 − η)Ei [φ] + ηUi)/(1+r) and the value of
being unemployed Ui =
(
biΦiPi + θim[θi] ¯ Ei + (1 − θimi[θi])Ui
)
/(1+r), where ¯ Ei is the value of
employment at the average ﬁrm. The ﬂow value of unemployment in real terms is given by biΦi
with bi ∈ [0,1] and is proportional to the marginal value product of labor at the average domestic
ﬁrm deﬂated by the price index: Φi ≡ ˜ φiipii [˜ φii]/Pi, with ˜ φii denoting the productivity of the
average ﬁrm. The variable bi is a proxy for the gross unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate.
Beneﬁts are ﬁnanced lump-sum. bi is a parameter in most of the literature. In this paper, it is
the key policy variable that will be set endogenously by governments.10
The ﬁrms’s surplus is equal to the marginal increase in the ﬁrm’s value ∂Ji [φ]/∂Lij [φ],
which results from the assumption that every worker is treated as the marginal worker. The
outcome of the bargaining process over the division of the surplus follows the “surplus-splitting”
rule: (1 − β)(Ei [φ] − Ui) = β
∂Ji[φ]
∂Lij[φ], where the parameter β measures the bargaining power of













The job creation curve slopes downward in θ. The reason is that a higher wage rate makes it
less attractive for ﬁrms to post vacancies, leading to a lower degree of labor market tightness.
Importantly, the wage rate depends only on aggregate variables such as P,Φ or θ and does,
therefore, not vary across ﬁrms. There is rent sharing ‘in the aggregate’, i.e., a lower net surplus
leads to lower wages, or a higher bargaining power of workers leads to higher wages, but there
is no ﬁrm-level rent sharing.
10We could easily link the ﬂow value of unemployment to wages by setting it equal to biwi: We decide to link
it to the average productivity Φi: In the model, wi is proportional to Φi; so that the two strategies are similar in
terms of their implications. It turns out that choosing the latter speciﬁcation somewhat simpliﬁes the analysis;
see the discussion in Felbermayr, Prat, Schmerer (2011a).















The wage curve is an increasing function of θ since workers have more power to hold-up the ﬁrm
when the labor market is tight and the costs of a break-down of negotiations are high for ﬁrms.
Labor market equilibrium is found by interacting the job creation curve and the wage curve.11
3.3 Entry- and Export Decisions of Firms
There is an inﬁnite number of potential ﬁrms which can enter the market after paying a ﬁxed
and sunk entry cost fe, measured in terms of the ﬁnal consumption good. After entering, they
draw their life-time constant productivity φ from a known distribution with p.d.f. g[φ] and
c.d.f. G[φ]. Only ﬁrms which draw a φ favorable enough to make non-negative proﬁts will
start production. A ﬁrm with productivity φ located in country i will engage in market j if the
expected discounted operating proﬁts exceed costs. Hence, the ﬁrm recruits workers with the







Lij [φ] − Pifij ≥ 0. (7)
The ﬁrst term in expression (7) is the discounted ﬂow of operating proﬁts that a ﬁrm in country
i with productivity φ obtains from sales in country j. The second term describes the costs of
initially recruiting all necessary workers. The ﬂow of proﬁts from sales to market j is given by






Lij[φ]−Pifij, which are revenues in country j of a ﬁrm based
in country i with productivity φ, Rij[φ], minus total costs of employing the necessary amount
of workers Lij to achieve those revenues including the costs to replace the workers who quit (at
exogenous rate χ) and the ﬁxed costs (in units of the ﬁnal good).
We may characterize the productivity level which makes a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between operating





= 0. Empirical evidence strongly supports the view that
11See for more details, speciﬁcally the uniqueness of the equilibrium and the general inﬂuence of trade on the
labor market Felbermayr, Prat, Schmerer (2011a).
14only the most productive ﬁrms select into foreign markets. Hence, we focus on parameter values
where φ∗
ij > φ∗
ii for all i,j. The ex ante probability of successful entry into the home market i is
(1 − G[φ∗
ii]), whereas the ex ante probability of exporting to country j conditional on successful





) /(1 − G[φ∗
ii]). The entry of new ﬁrms ensures zero expected proﬁts
in equilibrium. The mass of available varieties in country i is given by ¯ Mi = ϱjiMj + Mi,i ̸= j,
where Mj is the mass of active producers in country j.
3.4 Stationarity, Market Clearing Conditions, and General Equilibrium
As usual, we focus on a situation where ﬂows into and out of unemployment are of equal size,
hence η (1 − ui) = θimi [θi]ui. Similarly, we require that the ﬂow into the pool of operating ﬁrms
is equal to the ﬂow out of this pool; hence, (1−δ)(1 − G[φ∗
ii])Me
i = δMi, where Me
i is the total
mass of ﬁrms that attempt entry.12 On the labor market, by deﬁnition, we have Le
i = (1−ui)Li,
where Le
i is aggregate employment and Li is labor supply in country i. The mass of active
domestic ﬁrms adjusts so that the labor market clears, hence Mi = Le
i/(ϱijLij [˜ φij] + Lii [˜ φii]).
Total spending on the aggregate output good is deﬁned as the sum of revenues generated by
intermediate goods producing ﬁrms from sales on the domestic and export markets. Aggregate
income is the sum of payments to employed workers (equal to aggregate consumption expendi-
ture), on ﬂow ﬁxed costs fij, on appropriately discounted up-front investments fe, and on search
costs. In equilibrium trade is balanced. The budget constraint of the government is balanced.
Unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced in a lump-sum fashion, so that they only redistribute in-
come between employed and unemployed workers who share the same preferences.
3.5 Endogenous Labor Market Institutions
We now have built our two-country asymmetric trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and search
and matching frictions on the labor market. There are various ways how to endogenize labor
market institutions. Given our search and matching framework, one straight forward way is to
allow countries to choose the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
12Note that only a fraction 1    ﬁrms survive to the end of their ﬁrst period of existence.
15As we are interested in the interaction of the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts with
trade openness and country size, we allow the home country to choose the level of beneﬁts
for a given level of unemployment beneﬁts abroad. Speciﬁcally, we allow the home country
to set unemployment beneﬁts in order to maximize utility, which is equivalent to maximizing
consumption, given by wH(1−uH)LH (remember that PH = 1 due to our normalization). Note
that in general equilibrium, both wages wH and the unemployment rate uH are functions of
unemployment beneﬁts.




{wH[bH](1 − uH[bH])LH}. (8)
The ﬁrst order condition can be written as:
∂wH[bH]
∂bH




Hosios (1990) showed in a model with search and matching unemployment, perfect compe-
tition and homogeneous ﬁrms that the equality of the bargaining power β and the elasticity of
the matching function α leads to a constraint eﬃcient equilibrium. Hence, there are no Pareto
improvements possible. Note, however, that in our case this condition is not suﬃcient to ensure
an eﬃcient allocation because of the over-hiring externality. In terms of the ﬁrst order condi-
tion, this means that the marginal increase of wages weighted by (1 − uH[bH])LH, due to an
increase of unemployment beneﬁts at a level of unemployment beneﬁts of zero, is larger than
the marginal increase of the unemployment rate weighted by wH[bH]LH. We will discuss this
result in more detail in Section 5.
In addition to this utility-maximizing level of non-cooperative unemployment beneﬁts, we
investigate two sorts of cooperative outcomes. First, we allow the two countries to cooperatively
set unemployment beneﬁts in order to maximize joint utility. In particular we calculate the joint




{wH[bC](1 − uH[bC])LH + wF[bC](1 − uF[bC])LF}, (10)
16where bC = bH = bF. The ﬁrst order condition then reads:
∂wH[bC]
∂bC
(1 − uH[bC])LH +
∂wF[bC]
∂bC








Hence, any spill-overs due to changes in the labor market institutions from one country to the
other, as for example discussed in Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler (2009), will be partly
internalized by the joint utility-maximization, as can bee seen from the ﬁrst order condition
(11).
In this cooperative outcome we restrict countries to set equal levels of unemployment ben-
eﬁts. Since the countries are heterogenous and country features aﬀect the optimal choice of
unemployment beneﬁts as an instrument for internalizing the over-hiring externality, in general,
one requires two instruments to ensure an eﬃcient equilibrium. For example, the two cooper-
ative governments could decide on country-speciﬁc unemployment beneﬁts that maximize joint







where bCH and bCF are the cooperatively set unemployment beneﬁts in country H and F,
respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions then read as follows:
∂wH[bCH]
∂bCH
(1 − uH[bCH])LH +
∂wF[bCH]
∂bCH









(1 − uH[bCF])LH +
∂wF[bCF]
∂bCF







Similar to the case where the countries set a common level of unemployment beneﬁts in both
countries, this joint utility-maximization internalizes any spill-over eﬀects to the other country
via trade. However, additionally it does not restrict countries to symmetric policies.
174 Model Calibration
Both the Mortensen-Pissarides and the Melitz models have been calibrated extensively in the
literature so that we can follow the standard practice here. We calibrate the model for two
countries. In the benchmark case both countries are completely symmetric in the initial steady-
state and their equilibrium allocations replicate key empirical moments of the United States.
The size of the population is normalized to one for both countries. PH serves as the num´ eraire.
In our asymmetric settings, the larger country suﬀers less from trade costs because a smaller
share of varieties is imported and thus aﬀected by trade costs. So, the larger country has a
higher level of average productivity, and a lower rate of unemployment. Time is discrete and
the time interval is set to one month.
Following Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), we assume that ﬁrms sample their produc-
tivities from a Pareto distribution, so that the p.d.f. is g (φ) = γ ¯ φγφ−(1+γ), where the shape
parameter γ measures the rate of decay of the sampling distribution and is set equal to 3.4.
¯ φ > 0 is the minimum possible value of φ and, without loss of generality, is normalized to
¯ φ = 0.5.
Job separations occur either because the ﬁrm leaves the market or because the match itself
is destroyed. We consider that the ﬁrst type of shock δ arrives at a Poisson rate of 0.916 per
month. This implies that the annual gross rate of ﬁrm turnover is equal to 22%, as suggested
by the estimates in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004). The match-speciﬁc shocks
account for the job separations which are left unexplained by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock. Given that
Shimer (2005) estimates the monthly rate of job separation to be 0.034, it follows that the rate
of arrival of match-speciﬁc shocks χ should be equal to 0.025 per month.
We set the interest rate to 4% per year (r = 0.33%). The elasticity of substitution is set
equal to σ = 3.8. In order to calibrate the value of non-market activity abroad, we follow
Shimer (2005) and set bF = 0.4 to match an earnings replacement ratio close to 40%. The cost
of posting a vacancy c is set equal to one.
The share of exporters is put at about 21% by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003).
Together with τ = 1.3 and assuming a symmetric benchmark equilibrium, this pins down the
18ratio fij/fii at about 1.7. We use the values of entry costs fe and ﬂow ﬁxed costs fij to match
the following two moments. First, we ensure that the equilibrium tightness θi = 0.5 for all
countries in the benchmark equilibrium. Second, we target an average ﬁrm size equal to 21.8
employees, as estimated by Axtell (2001). The values following are fe = 39.57, fii = 0.116 and
fij = 0.197. The calibrated entry costs are equivalent to 2.82 years of income per capita.
The matching function is Cobb-Douglas ¯ m(θi)
−α . The results of Abowd and Allain (1996)
suggest that, in the case of individual bargaining, workers’ bargaining power is close to β = 0.5.
To calibrate the scale parameter ¯ m and the elasticity of the matching function α, we use empirical
estimates of the job ﬁnding rate and labor market tightness (Shimer, 2005, Hall, 2005). We
match an equilibrium tightness of 0.5, a monthly job ﬁlling rate to 0.9, and an optimal level of
unemployment beneﬁts of 40%. These choices imply ¯ m = 0.636 and α of 0.62.13 Hence, β < α,
so that even without the over-hiring externality present in our model, there is a welfare rationale
for using unemployment beneﬁts.
5 Is There a Case for Labor Market Institutions?
As we have laid out our model, the question might have arisen whether there is a case for labor
market institutions in this framework. Note that due to the matching friction on the labor
market and due to the heterogeneity of ﬁrms, marginal recruitment costs are increasing at the
aggregate level due to a congestion externality.
Hosios (1990) has shown that in the standard search and matching model with constant
returns to scale and perfect competition, the equality of the bargaining power and the elastic-
ity of the matching function implies that there is no government policy that leads to Pareto
improvements. In other words, under this condition, which is known as the Hosios condition,
13There are estimates of the elasticity of the matching function that point to a value of 0.5 (see for example
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). However, this means that the Hosios-condition would be fulﬁlled and the
optimal level of unemployment too low compared to what we observe. Hence, we have chosen the approach
to calibrate the elasticity of the matching function in order to ensure higher optimal unemployment beneﬁts in
equilibrium. The empirical evidence for unemployment beneﬁts seems much more reliable than the estimates for
the elasticity of the matching function. Note that we also could have set the elasticity of the matching function to
the value of 0:5 and calibrate the bargaining power in order to ﬁt optimal unemployment beneﬁts. However, this
would not eﬀect our results qualitatively. Our results hinge on the relative magnitudes of the bargaining power
and the elasticity of the matching function. But their absolute levels are not important for the qualitative results.
19unemployment is at its eﬃcient level. This implies that unemployment can be both too low and
too high when the condition is violated. Speciﬁcally, full employment is not eﬃcient, because
hiring becomes increasingly expensive as unemployment goes down. Note, however, that due
to the existence of the over-hiring externality, in our case, the Hosios condition is not suﬃcient
to ensure an eﬃcient allocation. For that reason, equilibrium unemployment will be generally
too low. Increasing unemployment beneﬁts counteracts the externality by “taxing” ﬁrms for
over-hiring workers (and, more generally, for posting too many vacancies, therefore creating
congestion costs).



















































Figure 2: The relationship between the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts b∗
H and the
elasticity of the matching function α.
Figure 2 plots the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts at home, b∗
H, for various levels
of the elasticity of the matching function, α. Note that we have set the bargaining power of
workers, β, equal to 0.5. Hence, the Hosios-condition is fulﬁlled when α = 0.5. However, as
can be seen, even in this case there exists a positive utility-maximizing level of unemployment
beneﬁts for the home country. When the elasticity of the matching function, α, increases,
holding constant the bargaining power of workers, β, the bargaining power of workers becomes
too low compared to the eﬃcient level. This leads to wages that are too low compared to the
eﬃcient level. Low wages will lead ﬁrms to hire too many workers and result in an ineﬃciently
low unemployment rate. Hence, a utility-maximizing policy of the home country is to increase
unemployment beneﬁts (up to a certain point).
206 Endogenous Labor Market Institutions and Openness
In this section we study the eﬀect of trade openness on the choice of labor market institutions.
As we have seen in the previous section, even when the Hosios-condition holds, i.e., β = α, there
exists a positive level of utility-maximizing unemployment beneﬁts in our framework. However,
in order to demonstrate the eﬀects more clearly, we proceed with a value of 0.62 for the elasticity
of the matching function.


















































Figure 3: The relationship between the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts b∗
H and openness
as measured by τ.
As can be seen from Figure 3, the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts in the home country
is an increasing function of trade openness. The more the home country is connected to a foreign
country, measured via lower variable trade costs, the higher are the optimal unemployment
beneﬁts. How can this result be explained? Before we can answer this question we have to
explain how trade liberalization aﬀects unemployment and how unemployment beneﬁts interact
with trade.
We begin our discussion by noting that trade liberalization aﬀects the distribution of pro-
ductivity among ﬁrms. Ineﬃcient ﬁrms in both countries face stronger competition by eﬃcient
foreign ﬁrms, making it impossible for them to cover the ﬂow ﬁxed costs. Additionally, labor
is reallocated towards exporters, which are the most productive ﬁrms, and away from purely
domestic ﬁrms, which are the least productive ﬁrms. If fij > fii, a fall in variable trade costs
leads to an increase of average domestic ﬁrm’s productivity, a fall in the equilibrium unemploy-
21ment rate and a rise in the real wage (see Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer, 2011a, Proposition
2). Note, that this result is in line with aggregate empirical evidence presented by Dutt, Mitra,
and Ranjan (2009), or Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011b).
Concerning the eﬀect of changes in unemployment beneﬁts, bH, we have to distinguish three
channels. The ﬁrst channel is an income eﬀect. When the home country increases unemployment
beneﬁts, unemployment goes up at home. As both the home and the foreign country spend part
of their income on foreign varieties, increased unemployment at home reduces not only demand
for home goods but also for goods from the foreign country. The second channel works via the
change in competitiveness. An increase of unemployment beneﬁts at home increases the home
workers’ threat point and therefore pushes up the real wage at home. Higher wages translate
into higher prices for domestic varieties, making domestic varieties relatively more expensive
compared to foreign varieties. Additionally, higher unemployment leads to an equilibrium with
fewer ﬁrms at home. Both of these eﬀects lead to an increase of the competitiveness of foreign
ﬁrms. The last channel is a selection eﬀect due to productivity heterogeneity of ﬁrms. A
reduction of aggregate spending is most harmful for highly productive ﬁrms. Hence, there is a
shift towards less productive ﬁrms, which are not aﬀected as much due to a reduction of aggregate
spending. This is exactly the opposite side of the selection eﬀect after trade liberalization
described by Melitz (2003). Summing up, we see that the competitiveness eﬀect tends to decrease
unemployment, but the unemployment-increasing income and the selection eﬀects dominate.
Hence, changing unemployment beneﬁts does not only aﬀect the home country, but also the
foreign country. Actually, an increase in unemployment beneﬁts at home will not only increase
unemployment at home but also abroad (for more details see Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler,
2009).
Thus, there is an externality between countries in the setting of labor market institutions.
If the home country increases its unemployment beneﬁts, part of the cost is spilled over to
the foreign country. Imports from the foreign country will be lower and the selection will lead
to more purely domestic and less productive ﬁrms at home. This increases the price for home
varieties, but not only for the home consumers, but also for the foreign consumers. Additionally,
some home ﬁrms stop exporting, as they are no longer able to cover the exporting ﬁxed costs.
Hence, the negative eﬀects of increasing unemployment beneﬁts are partly spilled over to the
22foreign country. The higher the level of trade openness, the more of the negative eﬀects can be
spilled over and, thus, the less costly becomes an increase in unemployment beneﬁts for the home
country. This explains the positive relationship between the utility-maximizing unemployment
beneﬁts and openness. It should be noted that this strategy, while maximizing utility in the
home country, reduces utility in the foreign country.
Note that this result ﬁts nicely with the empirical ﬁndings that more open countries seem to
have a larger welfare state (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998; Epifani and Gancia, 2009). Rodrik
(1997, 1998) argues that public spending may provide insurance in economies subject to the risk
of international markets. When exposure to risk grows after trade liberalization, the demand
for public insurance will increase, leading to a positive relationship between openness and the
size of the welfare-state. Epifani and Gancia (2009) add an additional channel to explain the
relationship between openness and government size. They argue that trade lowers the cost of
taxation due to a terms-of-trade externality. They ﬁnd empirical support for the terms-of-trade
channel. The two channels have very diﬀerent welfare implications. If the insurance argument
was correct, high unemployment beneﬁts would be eﬃcient from a world welfare perspective. If
the latter was correct high unemployment beneﬁts would be ineﬃcient, leaving room for policy
interventions.
Similar to the terms-of-trade externality, in our framework a positive level of unemployment
beneﬁts results from the ineﬃciency of the non-internalized labor market frictions. However,
our externality stems from an over-hiring of ﬁrms. The spill-overs to the foreign countries are
richer, working through the income, competitiveness and selection channel.
7 Endogenous Labor Market Institutions and Country Size
Besides openness, country size and the size of the welfare-state is a heavily discussed topic.
Speciﬁcally, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) argue that smaller countries have a larger share of
public consumption in GDP, and are also more open to trade. As compared to Rodrik (1997),
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) ﬁndings imply a diﬀerent but not mutually exclusive explanation for
the positive empirical relationship between openness and government size. In their framework,
openness is mediated through country size, leading to the conclusion that the direct link between
23openness and the share of government consumption is at least not as strong as suggested by
Rodrik (1997).























































Figure 4: The relationship between the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts b∗
H, openness as
measured by τ and country size (L).
Hence, we next investigate in our framework the link between endogenous labor market
institutions and country size. The results are shown in Figure 4. In the ﬁrst scenario, we
decrease the size of the home country from 1 to 0.5 and increase the size of the foreign country
to 1.5, all else equal, in order to keep the absolute size of the world economy constant at 2.
This is the scenario labeled LH = 0.5. In the second scenario, we increase the size of the home
country from 1 to 1.5 and decrease the size of the foreign country from 1 to 0.5. This scenario
is labeled LH = 1.5. As in Figure 3, we plot the optimal unemployment beneﬁts at home, b∗
H,
as a function of variable trade costs, τ. Alongside with the two new scenarios, we reproduce the
basic scenario with symmetric countries, i.e., LH = 1 and LF = 1, as given in Figure 3.
As we can see, smaller countries will ﬁnd it optimal to choose higher unemployment beneﬁts
than larger ones. The reason for this result lies in the channels described above. A smaller
country will spill-over a larger part of the negative consequences of higher unemployment beneﬁts
to the foreign trading partner through both the income and the selection channel. Note that in
this model a smaller country is more open, measured in terms of value of exports as a share of
GDP. Hence, the smaller country exports more abroad and imports more from abroad as a share
of GDP. Therefore the large foreign country will bear a larger share of the costs of an increase
in unemployment beneﬁts at home.
248 Simultaneous Setting of Labor Market Institutions
So far we investigated the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts of the home country, without
considering the foreign country. However, as labor market policies are set independently in each
country, one may wonder whether the foreign country has an incentive to react to changes of
unemployment beneﬁts at home.
In an interview with the Financial Times (March 16, 2010) France’s ﬁnance minister Christine
Lagarde suggested that Germany is hurting its European partners by “putting very high pressure
on its labor costs”. In other words, France’s ﬁnance minister claims that Germany’s labor market
framework inﬂuences economic outcomes in other European countries. She considers convergence
in diﬀerent institutional factors to be a necessary step towards economic success of European
countries. Her insinuation has sparked a vivid policy debate.

























































Figure 5: The best-response functions for unemployment beneﬁts of two symmetric countries.
Given this statement, we may ﬁrst investigate how independent countries would set optimal
unemployment beneﬁts, taken the reaction of other countries into account, as suggested by
France’s ﬁnance minister, who worries about labor market policies in Germany. Speciﬁcally, we
calculate the best-response functions in the b∗
F-b∗
H-space. Hence, for each value of unemployment
beneﬁt of the other country, we calculate the optimal unemployment beneﬁt. The intersection of
the best response functions leads to the non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium unemployment rates.
For this scenarios we set τ = 1.3 and α = 0.62.
25Figure 5 gives the best-response function for two perfectly symmetric countries. The striking
feature from this ﬁgure is the fact that the optimal unemployment beneﬁts at home are inde-
pendent from the level of foreign unemployment beneﬁts. Hence, there is a dominant strategy
which determines the level of optimal unemployment beneﬁts. This is astonishing, as we know
that the level of trade openness inﬂuences the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts, and as
we know that the level of unemployment beneﬁts has an eﬀect on the trading partner.

























































Figure 6: The best-response functions for unemployment beneﬁts when the home country is
relatively small (LH = 0.5) and the foreign country relatively large (LF = 1.5).
This result is not driven by the symmetry assumption. In Figure 6 we plot the best-response
functions for unemployment beneﬁts when the home country is relatively small (LH = 0.5) and
the foreign country relatively large (LF = 1.5). Again, the optimal levels of unemployment
beneﬁts are independent from each other. And in line with previous results, the smaller country
(in this case the home country) sets higher unemployment beneﬁts than the large country (in
this case the foreign country).
The reason for these results is the following. Changing unemployment beneﬁts raises wages
and thereby prices of varieties. However, it does so equally for all domestically produced varieties.
Raising unemployment beneﬁts at home raises wages and therefore prices for domestic varieties
and export varieties. Hence, consumers will shift demand to foreign varieties, which are relatively
cheaper now. At the same time higher unemployment beneﬁts lead to lower income, which
reduces demand for domestic and imported varieties. What are then the eﬀects of changes of
home unemployment beneﬁts for the foreign country? On the one hand, imports from abroad
26increase due to the relative cheaper price. On the other hand, imports from abroad decrease due
to lower aggregate home income. These two eﬀects oﬀ-set each other, so that the optimal level
of unemployment beneﬁts in the foreign country is not aﬀected by the level of unemployment
beneﬁts at home.
Note the diﬀerence of this result as compared to import tariﬀs. Due to the terms-of-trade
externality there are positive Nash-equilibrium tariﬀs and the reaction functions are negatively
slopped (see Gros, 1987, Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, 2009, and Felbermayr, Jung, and
Larch, 2011). However, import tariﬀs only aﬀect prices of imported goods directly. In contrast,
unemployment beneﬁts directly aﬀect prices of domestic and exported varieties. Hence, the
latter has not only a positive aﬀect on the terms-of-trade, as import tariﬀs, but also has a
considerable eﬀect on income due to the changes of prices for domestic varieties. Import tariﬀs
only aﬀect income via tariﬀ revenues and general equilibrium aﬀects. Hence, the negative income
aﬀect of higher tariﬀs is much smaller and not able to oﬀ-set the positive terms-of-trade aﬀect
in the case of import tariﬀs.
To sum up, these results suggests that even though the trading partner is aﬀected by labor
market policies abroad, changing own labor market policies as a reaction thereof is not a utility-
maximizing strategy. Independently of what other countries do, and even though welfare will
be inﬂuenced by that, the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts does not depend on foreign
policies.
9 Cooperative Setting of Labor Market Institutions
As a second step we ask what level of unemployment beneﬁts would be set by two coordinating
governments that cooperatively chose the optimal unemployment beneﬁts. This gives us a
benchmark against which we can judge on the one hand side the inﬂuence of the congestion
externality and on the other hand the role of openness and country size on the chosen level of
unemployment beneﬁts.
As explained in Section 3.5 we can either allow for country-speciﬁc levels of unemployment
beneﬁts or for one joint level of unemployment beneﬁts. In our symmetric setting these two
27cases coincide. Using the same calibration as above, i.e., τ = 1.3 and α = 0.62, we ﬁnd that
cooperatively set unemployment beneﬁts would be 35.7%, i.e., 4.4 percentage points lower than
the non-cooperatively set unemployment beneﬁts. Cooperative governments internalize the spill-
over eﬀects of labor market institutions, which leads to a lower optimal level of unemployment
beneﬁts in the cooperative setting. This lower level of unemployment beneﬁts corresponds to a
decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.2 percentage points from 6.9% to 6.7%.
In our asymmetric setting illustrated in Figure 6, the smaller home country sets the non-
cooperative unemployment beneﬁts at 43.4%, whereas the larger foreign country sets the unem-
ployment beneﬁts to 37.9%. When we allow the countries to cooperatively agree on country-
speciﬁc levels of unemployment beneﬁts, they will end up with unemployment beneﬁts of 37.8%
and 35% for the home and foreign country, respectively. Hence, even cooperatively set unem-
ployment beneﬁts vary with country size. The smaller country ends up with a higher level of
unemployment beneﬁts than the larger one. The reason lies in the eﬀects described in Sections 6
and 7. A smaller country has less labor to start with but trades relatively more than the larger
country. Hence, the smaller country has higher wages and a lower unemployment rate. Due to
the tightness of the labor market, the congestion externality on the labor market is stronger in
the smaller country, leading to a higher optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts. Remember that
the non-cooperative levels of unemployment beneﬁts for the home and foreign country was 43.4%
and 37.9%, respectively. Hence, cooperation leads to a decrease in the level of unemployment
beneﬁts by about 5.6 and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. Concerning the unemployment
rate we ﬁnd a decrease of about 0.3 and 0.15 percentage points in the home and foreign country
from around 6.7% to 6.4% and 7.0% to 6.85%.
When countries have to agree on a common level of unemployment beneﬁts, they end up
with a level of unemployment beneﬁts of 35.6%. Hence, in that case the larger country has
much more weight. The smaller country even looses in terms of welfare compared to the non-
cooperative setting. Hence, if countries cannot agree on country-speciﬁc unemployment beneﬁts
or side payments, a cooperation could not be reached. The smaller country has no incentive
to engage in cooperation, but instead prefers to set the non-cooperative level of unemployment
beneﬁts. This result is driven by our assumption that countries seek to maximize the weighted
28sum of utilities.14 It highlights the fact that also small countries need to be brought on board
in order to reach an agreement, even though in aggregate terms the welfare eﬀects of doing so
appear to be small. But they are not small if failure of coordination is taken into account.
10 Conclusion
Is there an optimal utility-maximizing level of labor market policies? This question is an old
one from a labor market perspective. However, with the increased interdependencies between
countries, this question has to be reevaluated. There is a quite substantial literature discussing
whether more open countries have a larger welfare state. Others brought country size into the
discussion: Smaller countries tend to trade more, and smaller countries have larger governments.
The causality seems not to be fully sorted out yet.
Concerning the theoretical work, there is renewed interest in studying the eﬀects of labor
market imperfections in trade models based on love-of-variety preferences, monopolistic compe-
tition and heterogeneous ﬁrms. While this literature brought new understanding of the eﬀects
of trade liberalization on unemployment, wages and inequality, the question about the optimal
level of labor market policies was not investigated so far.
This paper uses a two-country, one-sector, asymmetric trade model with heterogeneous ﬁrms
with search and matching frictions on the labor market, to investigate the question of how
countries optimally adopt their labor market institutions in the course of trade liberalization.
The main results are that more open economies and smaller economies tend to have larger
welfare states, and that the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts is independent from the
level of unemployment beneﬁts abroad. This copes with the empirical facts that smaller and
more open countries have larger governments. Additionally, cooperatively set unemployment
beneﬁts are lower than non-cooperatively set unemployment beneﬁts.
There are at least two questions open for future research. First, it may be interesting to
jointly consider the optimal choice of labor market policies and import tariﬀs. By making do-
14An alternative assumption not followed here would be to model the bargaining process between the two
countries.
29mestic varieties more expensive, unemployment beneﬁts make the markup distortion present
in monopolistic competition trade models stronger. Import tariﬀs, in turn, can mitigate that
distortion. Therefore, there may be an interesting complementarity between these two instru-
ments. Second, we have chosen to rationalize unemployment beneﬁts by violating the Hosios
condition. This is a natural choice in the context of a Melitz (2003) plus search-and-matching
model. However, it would be worth investigating, how international trade aﬀects the optimal
choice of beneﬁts when the underlying eﬃciency rationale is diﬀerent, e.g., if beneﬁts improve
job composition or if there is a real insurance issue. We have sidestepped comparative advantage
concerns. Including those into the analysis is a third interesting avenue for research.
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